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MEDICAL MARIJUANA DISPENSARIES IN CHAPTER 11
BANKRUPTCY
ABSTRACT
Since California passed the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, the
interaction between state and federal medical marijuana laws have been a
subject of frequent legal debate. But few have considered whether statecompliant medical marijuana dispensaries may seek assistance from the
bankruptcy system. Two dispensaries recently tested their ability to reorganize
under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, but the cases were quickly
dismissed. The U.S. Trustees argued that the debtors’ business activities
constituted “cause” to dismiss, lack of good faith in filing, and a “means
forbidden by law,” and left the debtor with little reasonable chance of success.
This Comment argues that the requirements in §§ 1112(b), 1129(a)(3), and
1129(a)(11) to propose and confirm a chapter 11 plan do not foreclose
bankruptcy protection for a medical marijuana business. Since medical
marijuana dispensaries are legitimate businesses under state statute, there
should be no lack of good faith or cause to dismiss the case under § 1112(b).
Therefore, chapter 11 plans should also be confirmable since § 1129(a)(3)
does not bar confirmation of plans based on the legality of the plan’s specific
terms, but rather on the legality of the manner of the plan’s proposal. Such a
plan should not be per se infeasible under § 1129(a)(11), although the risk of
federal intervention may be a factor weighing against a finding of feasibility.
Even if a court decides to assess the substance of a dispensary’s plan, they
may use their discretion to give greater weight to state rather than federal law.
Successful state legalization despite federal prohibition suggests the federal
government’s tacit acceptance of state-compliant dispensaries. Courts should
allow dispensaries to pursue bankruptcy to satisfy more creditors and preserve
a regulated medical marijuana market that protects patients and produces
positive externalities for society. Debtors should be allowed to fund their
repayment plans with state-compliant medical marijuana sales and leave
constitutional challenges of state legalization policies to their proper forums.
One group of marijuana business attorneys noted that if “bankruptcy courts
develop a policy of denial of bankruptcy relief to medical cannabis entities, the
legitimacy of the industry itself will continue to be stymied.”
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INTRODUCTION
Medical marijuana dispensaries sell goods, compete for customers, buy or
rent property, pay utility bills, hire employees, borrow from creditors, operate
under state licenses, and even pay taxes.1 Thus, they are subject to the same
forces that might steer many other businesses into financial trouble. Unlike the
deli next door, however, filing for bankruptcy might not be an available
solution for struggling dispensaries due to their uncertain legal status. Rather,
distressed medical marijuana dispensaries find their efforts to regain solvency
thwarted by the federal government’s battle with state legislators as both
entities jockey for control over the permissibility of medical marijuana.
The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) does not explicitly prohibit dispensaries
from filing for bankruptcy. But a U.S. Trustee has argued that medical
marijuana businesses, which are prohibited by federal law, provide sufficient
“cause” to dismiss under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b).2 Similarly, another trustee has
argued that dispensaries could not possibly propose a good-faith plan that is
not forbidden “by law.”3
An increasing number of state medical marijuana laws that directly
contradict the federal prohibition, coupled with the federal government’s lack
of enforcement,4 call into question whether courts should allow state-compliant
dispensaries to reorganize in chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Since 1970, the federal government has prohibited selling, growing, and
distributing marijuana through the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).5 In
1 See, e.g., Maureen O’Hagan & Jonathan Martin, Pot Dispensaries Clouding Medical Marijuana’s
Image, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 6, 2012, 8:04 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019363501_
medicalmarijuana07m.html?prmid=4939 (stating that, although a minority, about fifty medical marijuana
businesses in Washington paid taxes according to the state’s Department of Revenue).
2 United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss This Chapter 11 Case Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) at 2–
3, In re CGO Enterprise L.L.C., No. 12-19010 (Bankr. D. Colo. May 16, 2012), 2012 WL 1962267
[hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
3 United States Trustee’s Response to Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss Chapter 11 Bankruptcy at 2–3, In re
Mother Earth’s Alternative Healing Coop., Inc., No. 12-10223-11 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012).
4 See, e.g., Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Selected U.S. Attorneys
(Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/192 (announcing that the Department of
Justice would not focus on prosecuting marijuana dispensaries that are in clear compliance with state laws).
5 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012). Congress classified the drugs encompassed by the CSA into five categories,
or schedules, based on their medicinal value, potential for abuse, and effects on the body. Id. §§ 811–812. It
placed marijuana in schedule I, the most restrictive category. Id. Anyone who possesses, cultivates, or
distributes marijuana is subject to federal criminal sanctions, though federal prosecutors may choose to
approach certain cases of possession as a civil offense. Id. The manufacture, distribution, or possession with
intent to distribute marijuana is a felony. Id.
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Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court confirmed Congress’s power to regulate
noncommercial, purely intrastate production and use of marijuana for medical
purposes.6 Although the CSA operates at the outer bounds of Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause, it is clearly constitutional.7 Prior to
Gonzales, the Supreme Court rejected the common law medical necessity
defense for crimes of manufacturing and distributing marijuana in United
States v. Oakland Cannabis.8
Until recently,9 every state had prohibited the use and sale of marijuana for
nonmedical use since the 1930’s.10 However, after California passed the
Compassionate Use Act of 1996 to protect seriously ill patients who rely on
marijuana for medical use from “criminal prosecution or sanction,”11 other
states began to similarly contradict the CSA to allow medical marijuana.12
Today, twenty states and the District of Columbia have similar state or local
laws that remove criminal sanctions for qualifying patients, physicians, and
caregivers.13 Some of these laws also allow access to medical marijuana via
home cultivation or dispensaries.14
This Comment considers how the direct conflict between state and federal
law affects a dispensary’s ability to reorganize under federal bankruptcy
protection. Part I evaluates whether a medical marijuana business can
overcome a motion to dismiss for cause or lack of good faith under § 1112(b)
and propose a confirmable plan compliant with § 1129(a). Part II argues that a
bankruptcy judge may confirm a plan that relies on the sale and cultivation of
marijuana by deferring to state medical marijuana laws over the federal ban.
6

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Id. at 18.
8 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-Op, 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
9 Infra notes 208–212 and accompanying text.
10 Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power
to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1427 (2009); see infra notes 208–212 and accompanying
text.
11 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2009).
12 The Twenty States and One Federal District with Effective Medical Marijuana Laws, MARIJUANA
POLICY PROJECT (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/MMJLawsSummary.pdf.
13 Id. The other states and federal districts that have legalized medical marijuana are: Arizona, Alaska,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Washington. See Chelsea Conaboy, Massachusetts Voters Approve Ballot Measure to Legalize Medical
Marijuana, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 6, 2012, 10:34 PM), http://www.boston.com/metrodesk/2012/11/06/
massachusetts-voters-approve-ballot-measure-legalize-medicalmarijuana/EpDzgJGfBjnOAkoXpJwm1K/story.html.
14 The Twenty States, supra note 12.
7
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Finally, Part III considers how the goals of bankruptcy, other public policy,
and potential safeguards suggest that courts should treat medical marijuana
businesses no differently than any other businesses permitted to reorganize
under chapter 11.
I. BACKGROUND
A. “Cause” to Dismiss Under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)
Section 1112(b) permits a party in interest to request the dismissal of a case
upon demonstration of “cause.”15 Under the same provision, courts may also
dismiss a chapter 11 case sua sponte.16 The cause standard is intended to
further the basic purposes of chapter 11. Its goals include preserving viable
businesses while maximizing creditors’ return, facilitating negotiations to
accommodate each party’s interests, and producing a reasonable opportunity
for plan confirmation.17
Section 1112(b)(4) provides a nonexclusive list of sixteen items that
constitute grounds for dismissal for cause.18 Although filing a petition in bad
faith is not explicitly included in this list, courts have overwhelmingly held that
a debtor’s lack of good faith in filing a petition establishes cause for
dismissal.19
Section 1112(b) “measures the value of maintaining the [bankruptcy]
process, and also polices the diligence of the debtor or other plan proponent to
ensure that the process is proceeding with all deliberate speed and in
accordance with the requirements of applicable law.”20 The cause standard
recognizes that “when there is no reasonable likelihood that the statutory
objective of reorganization can be realized or when the debtor unreasonably
15

11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012).
In re Starmark Clinics, L.P., 388 B.R. 729, 736 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008); 11 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
¶ 1112.04[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010).
17 11 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1112.04[5].
18 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4). According to the rules of construction, “includes” as used here is not limiting.
Id. § 102(3).
19 See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Nucor Corp. (In re SGL Carbon Corp.), 200 F.3d
154, 160 (3d Cir. 1999); Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Although [§]
1112(b) does not explicitly require that cases be filed in ‘good faith,’ courts have overwhelmingly held that a
lack of good faith in filing a [c]hapter 11 petition establishes cause for dismissal.”); In re Winshall Settlor’s
Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1137 (6th Cir. 1985) (“[A]n implicit prerequisite to the right to file is ‘good faith’ on the
part of the debtor, the absence of which may constitute cause for dismissal under § 1112(b).”).
20 11 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1112.07[1].
16
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delays,” provisions meant to help the debtor accomplish reorganization, such
as the automatic stay, begin to run counter to the interests of the creditors.21
The bankruptcy court may therefore “effectuate the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code,” including the implied good faith requirement, to protect the
creditors.22
This has been reflected in a key test of good faith—whether the plan was
“legally and economically feasible.”23 The term “legally” has been used to
ensure that the debtor intends to reorganize to satisfy rather than deter or harass
creditors.24
Some courts hold that cause to dismiss for lack of good faith arises when
“either objective futility or subjective bad faith” is shown.25 Other courts
require both a likelihood of ultimate futility and bad faith of the petitioner to
create sufficient grounds to dismiss.26
Generally, there are three scenarios that may implicate a lack of good faith:
“(1) one-asset (usually real estate) debtor cases; (2) cases that resort to
bankruptcy court protection in order to make strategic use of a specific
bankruptcy law right or power; and (3) cases that use of bankruptcy to secure a
tactical litigation advantage.”27
B. Courts Disagree over the Meaning of the 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3)
Requirement to Propose a Plan “Not by Any Means Forbidden by Law”
While a court may not dismiss for cause early in the bankruptcy case, the
court may later refuse to confirm the debtor’s plan.28 Failing to confirm a plan
may lead the court to dismiss the debtor’s case. A debtor’s plan must meet a
number of requirements in § 1129(a) to be confirmed.29 Section 1129(a)(3)
requires that a plan be “proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden

21 United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs.), 808 F.2d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff’d, 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
22 Id.
23 In re Strug-Div., L.L.C., 375 B.R. 445, 449 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007).
24 Id.
25 Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel
of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 919, 925 (1991).
26 Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 700 (4th Cir. 1989); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 25.
27 Id. at 927.
28 11 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1112.07.
29 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2012) (“The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements
are met . . . .”).
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by law.”30 Courts generally consider the “good faith” and the “forbidden by
law” components of §1129(a)(3) separately.31
The “good faith” language in § 1129(a)(3) is distinct from the good faith
prerequisite to filing a petition read into § 1112(b).32 Good faith under
§ 1129(a)(3) is “more narrowly focused, and tests directly whether the debtor’s
conduct in formulating, proposing and confirming a plan displays the requisite
honesty of intention.”33 This is in contrast to the good faith prerequisite to
filing a petition in § 1112(b). Still, courts have the discretion to refuse to
dismiss the case if it concludes that the creditors would be better served while
the debtor remains in bankruptcy.34
The second inquiry in §1129(a)(3), whether a plan is “not by any means
forbidden by law,” has been overshadowed by the good faith inquiry.35 Courts
have focused largely on the plan’s ability to reorganize the debtor in a manner
consistent with the objectives of the Code when considering this part of
§1129(a)(3).36
Courts differ on what “law” to consider when assessing a plan’s legality.
They have referred to both federal and state nonbankruptcy law.37 In In re
Koelbl, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the language “‘means forbidden
by law’ refers inter alia to state law.”38 On the other hand, in In re Texas
Extrusion Corp., the Fifth Circuit considered whether the reorganization plan
was part of an alleged conspiracy to violate federal antitrust laws.39
Source of law aside, courts have disagreed on how to determine whether a
plan was proposed by “means forbidden by law.” Some courts have focused on
30 Id. § 1129(a)(3). Section 1225(a)(3) also requires that chapter 12 debtors propose a plan “in good faith
not by any means forbidden by law.” Id. § 1225(a)(3).
31 See, e.g., In re Frascella Enters., 360 B.R. 435, 445–46 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007); In re Jartran, Inc., 44
B.R. 331, 388–89 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984), aff’d, 886 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1989).
32 See 11 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1112.07.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., In re Multiut Corp., 449 B.R. 323, 341–43 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011); In re TCI 2 Holdings,
L.L.C., 428 B.R. 117, 143–44 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010).
36 In re Bravo Enters. USA, L.L.C., 331 B.R. 459, 472 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005); 6 WILLIAM L. NORTON,
JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 112:10 (3d ed. 2013).
37 See, e.g., In re Tex. Extrusion Corp., 844 F.2d 1142, 1160 (5th Cir. 1988) (referring to federal antitrust
laws); In re Flor, 166 B.R. 512, 515 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (referring to Connecticut state law); In re Jartran,
Inc., 44 B.R. 331, 387 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (referring to federal law on bankruptcy crimes), aff’d 886 F.2d
859 (7th Cir. 1989).
38 In re Koelbl, 751 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1984).
39 Tex. Extrusion Corp., 844 F.2d at 1160.
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the plan’s substance and asked whether the activities proposed to satisfy claims
were contrary to some nonbankruptcy law.40 Other courts refused to assess the
legality of the plan’s provisions.41 Instead, those courts focused on the
proposal of the plan and assessed “the conduct manifested in obtaining the
confirmation votes of a plan of reorganization and not necessarily on the
substantive nature of the plan.”42
C. The 11 U.S.C. 1129(a)(11) Feasibility Standard
A confirmable plan must have a reasonable chance of success, as required
by § 1129(a)(11).43 This is commonly referred to as the feasibility standard.44
Section 1129(a)(11) conditions plan confirmation on the court’s finding that
“confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the
need for further financial reorganization.”45 The purpose of § 1129(a)(11) is
“to prevent confirmation of visionary schemes which promise
creditors . . . more . . . than the debtor can possibly attain.”46 “The feasibility
standard is whether the plan offers a reasonable assurance of success. Success
need not be guaranteed.”47
The debtor is only required to prove that its reorganization plan is feasible
by a preponderance of the evidence.48 Courts have described this threshold of

40

See Settling States v. Carolina Tobacco Co. (In re Carolina Tobacco Co.), 360 B.R. 702, 713 (D. Or.
2007), vacated, Alabama v. Carolina Tobacco Co. (In re Carolina Tobacco Co.), No. 05-34156, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 35229 (D. Or. Feb. 22, 2012); In re Flor, 166 B.R. at 515.
41 See, e.g., In re Frascella Enters., 360 B.R. 435, 445 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007); In re Food City, Inc., 110
B.R. 808, 812 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); see also Richard M. Cieri, Barbara J. Oyer & Dorothy J. Birnbryer,
“The Long and Winding Road”: The Standards to Confirm a Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Part I), 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3, 39–40 (1993).
42 In re Sovereign Grp., 1984-21 Ltd., 88 B.R. 325, 328 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (citing 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. 1984)); see, e.g., Tex. Extrusion
Corp., 844 F.2d at 1160 (stating that reorganization plan that is part of an alleged conspiracy to violate federal
antitrust laws would be prohibited); In re Koelbl, 751 F.2d at 139 (explaining that use of trade secrets or
confidential information in violation of New York state law to propose plan would be prohibited).
43 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012).
44 Stephanie Gleason, Marijuana Dispensary’s Chapter 11 Case Burns Out, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Oct. 8,
2012, 3:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/10/08/marijuana-dispensarys-chapter-11-case-burnsout/.
45 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).
46 Pizza of Haw., Inc. v. Shakey’s, Inc. (In re Pizza of Haw., Inc.), 761 F.2d 1374, 1382 (9th Cir. 1985)
(quoting 5 COLLIER, supra note 42, ¶ 1129.02).
47 Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988).
48 Fin. Sec. Assurance, Ltd. v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship (In re T-H New Orleans P’shp), 116 F.3d
790, 801 (5th Cir. 1997).
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proof as “relatively low.”49 In fact, “the mere potential for failure of the plan is
insufficient to disprove feasibility.”50 Instead, a court reviewing a bankruptcy
plan must consider the totality of the circumstances.51 This may “include the
earning power of the business, its capital structure, economic conditions, the
continuation of present management, and the efficiency of the management in
control of the business after confirmation.”52 This approach could result in the
confirmation of a plan that has less than a 50% chance of success.53
II. PROCEDURAL CAPACITY TO REMAIN IN CHAPTER 11
In the summer of 2012, two medical marijuana dispensaries sought the
protection of chapter 11.54 Given the novelty of these cases and the nature of
the debtors’ businesses, it was unclear whether bankruptcy courts would allow
the dispensaries to remain in bankruptcy.55 Although neither case was decided
on a “good faith” analysis, in dicta the court in CGO Enterprise L.L.C. offered
insight into how an examination of complex federalism issues presented in a
dispensary filing might be conducted.56
Section A discusses the arguments put forth by U.S. Trustees seeking to
dismiss these recent medical marijuana bankruptcies. Section B argues that
proposing a plan funded by the sale of medical marijuana does not necessarily
create cause to dismiss the case under § 1112(b) or implicate a lack of good
faith in filing. Section C explains that courts have interpreted § 1129(a)(3) to
require that the plan proposal, rather than the specific contents of the plan, be
49 Computer Task Grp., Inc. v. Brotby (In re Brotby), 303 B.R. 177, 191 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted) (“The Code does not require the debtor to prove that success is inevitable, and a relatively low
threshold of proof will satisfy § 1129(a)(11), so long as adequate evidence supports a finding of feasibility.”);
see also Gen. Elec. Credit Equities, Inc. v. Brice Rd. Devs., L.L.C. (In re Brice Rd. Devs., L.L.C.), 392 B.R.
274, 283 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008).
50 S & P, Inc. v. Pfeifer, 189 B.R. 173, 182–83 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (quoting In re Drexel Burnham Lambert
Grp., 138 Bankr. 723, 762 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
51 In re Mulberry Phosphates, Inc., 149 B.R. 702, 709 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
52 Id.
53 See Rafael I. Pardo, Reconceptualizing Present-Value Analysis in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 113, 147–48 (2011) (describing the chapter 11 financial feasibility standard as “two more-likelythan-not assessments”).
54 See In re CGO Enter. L.L.C., No. 12-19010, 2012 WL 1962267 (Bankr. D. Colo. May 16, 2012);
Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Mother Earth’s Alternative Healing Coop., Inc., No. 12-10223-11 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. June 25, 2012).
55 Stephanie Gleason, Blunt Force: Landlord Cleared to Evict Marijuana Dispensary, WALL ST. J.
BANKR. BEAT BLOG (Aug. 22, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/08/22/blunt-forcelandlord-cleared-to-evict-marijuana-dispensary/.
56 Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2; Marijuana Dispensary’s Chapter 11, supra note 44.
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free from any illegalities. Courts have even confirmed plans that required the
debtor to violate nonbankruptcy laws.57 Section D argues that, although there is
some possibility that federal forfeiture may prevent completion of a debtor
dispensary’s plan, the risk may not arise to a reasonable probability of failure.
Thus, a plan relying on the sale of medical marijuana may be feasible under
§ 1129(a)(11).
A. U.S. Trustees’ Arguments to Dismiss in Recent Medical Marijuana Cases
1. Trustee in CGO Enterprise Argued that Proposing a Plan to Sell
Medical Marijuana Indicates Lack of Good Faith
A U.S. Trustee objected to the chapter 11 filing of a Denver-based medical
marijuana cultivator CGO Enterprise, L.L.C., arguing that the dispensary’s
filing was not made in good faith.58 The trustee also argued that CGO’s failure
to respond to the court’s notice of deficiency was a second basis for
dismissal.59 According to its petition, CGO owed a total of $896,000 in
unsecured claims.60 Of its $142,970 in listed assets, $130,000 consisted of
uncultivated medical marijuana crops.61
Citing In re Strug-Div., L.L.C., the trustee raised § 1112(b), to explain that
§ 1112(b) provides for dismissal when the debtor cannot “propose a legally
and economically feasible plan of reorganization.”62 But, the court in StrugDiv., used the term “legally” to ensure that the debtor intended to reorganize to
satisfy, rather than deter or harass, creditors.63 Moreover, the trustee seemingly
conflated the good faith prerequisite read into § 1112(b) with the good faith
provision in § 1129(a)(3).64 Requesting the court to dismiss CGO’s case under
§ 1112(b), the trustee argued that CGO’s proposed plan “will have to be

57 Settling States v. Carolina Tobacco Co. (In re Carolina Tobacco Co.), 360 B.R. 702, 711 (D. Or. 2007)
vacated, Alabama v. Carolina Tobacco Co. (In re Carolina Tobacco Co.), No. 05-34156, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35229 (D. Or. Feb. 22, 2012).
58 Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2; see also Hilary Bricken, MMJ Bankruptcy? Not So Fast, CANNA
LAW BLOG (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.cannalawblog.com/mmj-bankruptcy-not-so-fast/.
59 Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 3.
60 Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, at 3, 10, In re CGO Enter. L.L.C., No. 12-19010 (Bankr. D. Colo. May
1, 2012), 2012 WL 1962267.
61 Id. at 6.
62 Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 2 (citing In re Strug-Div., L.L.C., 375 B.R. 445, 449 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2007)).
63 In re Strug-Div., L.L.C., 375 B.R. at 449.
64 See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2.
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proposed ‘by means forbidden by law’” under § 1129(a)(3),65 which requires
good faith in the proposal of a plan, rather than the filing of a petition.66
According to the trustee, CGO failed one or both good faith tests because CGO
would inevitably have to rely on the sale of its marijuana crops to fund its
bankruptcy plan.67 The trustee noted that the sale and cultivation of marijuana
is a federal crime under the CSA, but did not mention Colorado state law.68
The debtor subsequently communicated to the trustee that the debtor would
not oppose the motion to dismiss.69 In its response, the debtor acknowledged
that it failed to file required financial reports and supplements to its voluntary
petition and that the debtor’s business was “no longer solvent or capable of
being operated as a viable and ongoing concern.”70 Although the debtor
requested that the court grant the trustee’s motion to dismiss, the debtor
disagreed with the allegations of criminal activity.71
The court ultimately dismissed the case for CGO’s failure to produce
missing documents in accordance with the court’s “Notice of Deficiency for
Omission of Information.”72 This might suggest that bankruptcy courts are
resistant to take on this issue despite the trustee’s arguments.
2. Trustee in In re Mother Earth’s Alternative Healing Cooperative Argued
that a Plan to Sell Medical Marijuana is Forbidden by Law
Soon after CGO’s bankruptcy was dismissed, a medical marijuana
dispensary named Mother Earth’s Alternative Healing Cooperative filed for
chapter 11 in California.73 The dispensary complied with California’s medical

65

Id.
11 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1112.07.
67 Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2.
68 Id. at 3.
69 Debtor’s Joint Response to Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss and Order to File Status Report, In re CGO
Enter. L.L.C., No. 12-19010 (Bankr. D. Colo. May 25, 2012), 2012 WL 1932712.
70 Id. The debtor also acknowledged the “complications regarding the ‘ownership’ of individual medical
marijuana plants under applicable Colorado law.” Id.
71 Id.
72 In re CGO Enter. L.L.C., No. 12-19010 (D. Colo. dismissed July 13, 2012); see also Katy Stech,
Judge Puts Out Marijuana Grower’s Chapter 11 Case, WALL ST. J. BANKR. BEAT BLOG (June 13, 2012, 2:56
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/06/13/judge-puts-out-marijuana-grower%E2%80%99s-chapter11-case/.
73 Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Mother Earth’s Alt. Healing Coop., Inc., No. 12-10223-11
(Bankr. S.D. Ca. dismissed Oct. 23, 2012).
66
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marijuana laws74 and was the only licensed dispensary in southern California.75
Like CGO, the main asset of Mother Earth’s was marijuana it intended to sell
to patients.76 Unlike CGO’s substantial insolvency, however, Mother Earth
sought bankruptcy mainly for the protection of the automatic stay to prevent its
landlord from evicting Mother Earth in response to pressure from the federal
government.77
The trustee in Mother Earth’s objected and moved to dismiss on grounds
similar to the trustee in CGO.78 The trustee claimed that this case was a bad
faith filing under § 1112(b) because Mother Earth’s could not have proposed a
plan of reorganization that met the requisite good faith in proposing a plan in
§ 1129(a)(3).79 The trustee reasoned that the debtor’s only means of funding a
chapter 11 plan would be by cultivating and distributing a federally prohibited
substance, which ran afoul of the “not by any means forbidden by law”
condition to confirmation residing in § 1129(a)(3).80
Unlike in CGO, the trustee in this case acknowledged that California state
law may allow the sale of medical marijuana.81 But the trustee did not mention
how this might affect the debtor’s ability to reorganize under chapter 11.82
While this conflict between state and federal law raises preemption issues, the
trustee sidestepped them by ignoring the state laws, under which the debtor
would not violate § 1129(a)(3), and focused entirely on the Supreme Court
upholding federal regulation of marijuana in Gonzales v. Raich.83
The court dismissed the case, stating, “Cause for dismissal exists where the
only bankruptcy purpose is to attempt to preserve a lease and to otherwise
support a business that is engaged in activity that is prohibited, indeed
criminal, under federal law.”84 Since Mother Earth’s admitted that its goal was
74 See Letter from Bob Filner, U.S. Representative, to Laura E. Duffy, U.S. Attorney (July 13, 2012),
available at http://media.sdreader.com/news/documents/2012/07/23/AAA_2012-07-17-My_Mother_Earth_
Co-op_Letter_to_Laura_Duffy.pdf.
75 Blunt Force, supra note 55.
76 Stephanie Gleason, Chapter 420?, WALL ST. J. BANKR. BEAT BLOG (July 27, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/07/27/chapter-420/.
77 Id.
78 See United States Trustee’s Response to Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, No. 1210223-11 (Bankr. S.D. Ca. Sept. 4, 2012).
79 Id. at 3.
80 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012)).
81 Id.
82 See id.
83 Id.
84 Marijuana Dispensary’s Chapter 11, supra note 44.
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to avoid eviction through the automatic stay rather than to produce a plan to
repay its creditors, the court could have dismissed the case irrespective of the
nature of its business or manner of funding its reorganization. Still, the court
found that confirmation and consummation of the plan was impossible under
§ 1129(a)(11) because the proceeds from the sale of marijuana would have
been subject to forfeiture, an argument that the trustee did not make in its
motion to dismiss.85 The court emphasized, however, that it would not oversee
Mother Earth’s sale of marijuana since such conduct is in violation of the
CSA.86
B. No Cause to Dismiss Under § 1112(b) or for Lack of Good Faith
Filing for bankruptcy when a debtor’s assets and income are linked to the
medical marijuana industry does not fall within the three general scenarios that
may implicate a lack of good faith, regardless of the dismissals of the cases
above.87
Even if the court in CGO had dismissed the case for lack of good faith
under § 1112(b) or § 1129(a)(3), it would be merely one decision to consider
as part of the evolution of what type of conduct and cases bankruptcy courts
find permissible.88 The good faith doctrine has been described as “the
instrument of a controlled evolution” that “systematically [tests bankruptcy
courts’] performance in guarding the portal into bankruptcy.”89 Courts’
conclusions on what is appropriate in bankruptcy, and thus the good faith
doctrine, change to accommodate “evolving reality of social, political, and
economic challenges.”90
No circuit court has addressed these issues in a medical marijuana business
case. Moreover, even if a bankruptcy court ultimately denies plan
confirmation, the debtor and its creditors might not consider the bankruptcy a

85 Order After Hearing Dismissing Chapter 11 Case at 2‒3, In re Mother Earth’s Alt. Healing Coop.,
Inc., No. 12-10223-11 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2012).
86 Marijuana Dispensary’s Chapter 11, supra note 44.
87 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 25, at 927.
88 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 25, at 973–74 (“[P]ast decisions serve merely to highlight the
flow and development of bankruptcy policy; they do not forever establish its boundaries. Therefore, it is
important to go beyond mechanical division of the cases in favor of a more demanding and policy-sensitive
analysis.”).
89 Id. at 972.
90 Id. at 972–73.
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failure.91 Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook stated, “While it is
true that not every confirmed plan would meet a refined definition of success,
the reverse is equally true: not every company whose [c]hapter 11 case is
dismissed represents a complete failure.”92 Often, debtors use the breathing
room afforded through the automatic stay as an opportunity to negotiate a
satisfactory plan with its creditors. “Anecdotal evidence from experienced
bankruptcy lawyers and judges suggests that a fair number of cases are
dismissed because debtors and creditors have worked out a settlement that they
were not able to achieve prior to the [c]hapter 11 filing.”93 A settlement
satisfactory to both parties provides the debtor with a fresh start and repays
creditors, two fundamental goals of bankruptcy,94 and therefore may be
considered a success facilitated by the bankruptcy system even though
discharge is never achieved.
C. Section 1129(a)(3) Does Not Open Inquiry into the Substantive Nature of
the Plan
The federal bankruptcy system does not nullify state laws.95 “Unless
preempted by the Code, state laws remain in place and a debtor must be able to
comply with those state laws for a plan to be confirmed.”96 The Code is silent
on whether the business activities of a state-compliant medical marijuana
dispensary are impermissible as part of a reorganization plan. Thus, state
medical marijuana laws are not in conflict with the Code, and should remain in
place throughout the plan confirmation stage.
Moreover, there is sufficient jurisprudence to suggest the trustees insistence
on compliance with federal law in Mother Earth’s and CGO was a misguided
attempt to apply § 1129(a)(3) to the debtors’ plans. As explained by the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District in New York in In re Buttonwood
Partners, “[T]here is no requirement imposed by § 1129(a) that the contents of

91 See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the
Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 611 (2009).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 In re Epstein, 39 B.R. 938, 941 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1984).
95 See Settling States v. Carolina Tobacco Co. (In re Carolina Tobacco Co.), 360 B.R. 702, 711 (D. Or.
2007), vacated Alabama v. Carolina Tobacco Co. (In re Carolina Tobacco Co.), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35229
(D. Or. Feb. 22, 2012).
96 Id.
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a plan comply in all respects with the provisions of all nonbankruptcy laws and
regulations.”97
The court explored the legislative history that compels this reading of
§ 1129(a)(3):
Section 1129(a)(3) is derived from § 221(3) of the Bankruptcy Act
which stated that the court could confirm a plan if satisfied that “the
proposal of the plan and its acceptance are in good faith and have not
been made or procured by means or promises forbidden by this Act.”
Consequently, given the relationship between § 221(3) of the Act and
§ 1129(a)(3), it must be construed that the term “means forbidden by
law” subsumes some conduct in connection with obtaining
confirmation of such proposal. The enlargement from “forbidden by
this Act” to “forbidden by law” merely “‘requires that the proposal of
the plan comply with all applicable law, not merely the bankruptcy
98
law.’”

A bankruptcy court should not be the forum to determine substantive state
and federal law. Doing so would impose requirements on bankruptcy judges
that are “inimical to the basic function of bankruptcy judges in bankruptcy
proceedings.”99 According to the court, this construction “would convert the
bankruptcy judge into an ombudsman without portfolio, gratuitously seeking
out possible ‘illegalities’ in every plan.”100
Permitting a bankruptcy judge unbridled jurisdiction over matters of state
law also jeopardizes the holding of Stern v. Marshall. In Stern, the Supreme
Court held that bankruptcy courts lack the constitutional authority to enter a
final judgment on state law counterclaims.101 Since a bankruptcy court might
rely on state law to reason that a plan contains some illegality, requiring this
ombudsman role is akin to asking bankruptcy courts to adjudicate state law
counterclaims.
Further, even though a court may deny confirmation because the
substantive nature of the plan violates the CSA, § 1129(a)(3) may be
interpreted such that courts would not require an open inquiry into this

97

In re Buttonwood Partners, 111 B.R. 57, 59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Id. at 59–60 (quoting In re Koelbl, 751 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir.1984)).
99 In re Food City, Inc., 110 B.R. 808, 812 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 397
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5963).
100 Id.
101 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011).
98
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substantive nature. Then a court would not even need to reach or address this
conflict between state and federal law.102
Moreover, other sections of the Code demonstrate that Congress sought to
preserve the adjudication of matters external to the plan to the judgment of
other tribunals. Assessing the substance of a plan for illegalities is unnecessary
since the discharge granted after plan confirmation does not shield debtors
from post-confirmation actions, even if they arise from the plan itself.103
Section 1141(d) also limits the debtor’s discharge in several ways.104 More
importantly, Congress specifically excluded criminal proceedings from the
automatic stay in § 362(b)(1).105
Blocking plan confirmation when the plan contains terms that might violate
laws would also introduce logistical hurdles to the confirmation process—not
to mention delay relief to creditors and waste judicial resources.106 As one
court explained:
All regulatory agencies (and there are thousands) would have to
participate in all chapter 11 cases, introducing extraordinary delay
into the system and imposing an impossible burden on the agencies.
Moreover, a rule which requires a debtor to affirmatively represent in
its plan and disclosure statement that the plan does not violate any
law imposes an unrealistic due diligence burden upon both the debtor
and debtor’s counsel. The extraordinary legal costs of sustaining such
a burden would inevitably be borne by the estate’s unsecured
107
creditors.

Courts have recognized, “Because only the proposal of the plan must not be
by a means forbidden by law, plans proposing terms that arguably violate some
statute or common law doctrine have passed muster under [§] 1129(a)(3).”108
For example, in In re Carolina Tobacco Co., the court concluded that the
“debtor’s proposal to pay the prepetition escrow deposits over time is not
forbidden by law, even though it means that debtor will be out of compliance

102 See, e.g., In re Frascella Enters., Inc., 360 B.R. 435, 445 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (refusing to analyze
the potential illegalities in the debtor’s chapter 11 plan).
103 Food City, 110 B.R. at 813.
104 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (2012).
105 Id. § 362(b)(1).
106 See Food City, 110 B.R. at 813.
107 Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
108 Cieri, Oyer & Birnbryer, supra note 41.
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with state law until the prepetition escrow deposits are made.”109 Here, the
court even acknowledged that the state law was not preempted by the Code and
was a consideration in the plan confirmation.110
In re Frascella Enterprises provides another example of a chapter 11 plan
satisfying § 1129(a)(3) even though the plan’s terms may have violated state or
federal law. In this case, the debtor sought to salvage its payday lending
business through chapter 11 bankruptcy.111 However, the debtor was involved
in a consumer class action at the time of its bankruptcy.112 Consumers sought
damages against the debtor for payday loans they received from the debtor that
allegedly violated usury laws.113 The consumers objected to confirmation of
the debtor’s plan because it was to be funded by these same payday loan
practices.114
Similar to how the trustees in CGO and Mother Earth argued that the
dispensaries’ businesses violated the CSA, the consumers in In re Frascella
argued that the debtor’s “contemplated business activity of payday lending
over the telephone and internet to consumers in Pennsylvania violates state and
federal consumer law.”115 However, the court abstained from fully evaluating
the legality of the debtor’s payday lending, reasoning that it was beyond its
role in the bankruptcy system.116 This suggests that courts are unwilling to
analyze the contents of a plan for potential illegalities when it is unclear how
relevant state and federal laws would play out for the questioned activity.
Other courts have confirmed that it is not the bankruptcy court’s role to
decide a preemption question when there is a conflict between state and federal
laws.117 In In re Food City, the court similarly stated that “convert[ing] the
bankruptcy judge into an ombudsmen without portfolio” is contrary to the
“basic function of bankruptcy judges in bankruptcy proceedings . . . .”118 If
determining whether a plan contains illegalities is beyond the realm of
109 Settling States v. Carolina Tobacco Co. (In re Carolina Tobacco Co.), 360 B.R. 702, 713 (D. Or.
2007), vacated Alabama v. Carolina Tobacco Co. (In re Carolina Tobacco Co.), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35229
(D. Or. Feb. 22, 2012).
110 Id. at 711.
111 In re Frascella Enters., Inc., 360 B.R. 435, 437 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007).
112 Id. at 439.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 440.
115 Id. at 445.
116 Id. (citing In re Food City, Inc., 110 B.R. 808, 812 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990)).
117 Food City, 110 B.R. at 812.
118 Id.
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bankruptcy courts, then deciding whether state or federal law is the authority
on a potential illegality must also go beyond the bankruptcy courts’
responsibilities.
In the medical marijuana industry, such a due diligence burden would
require the Drug Enforcement Administration and state drug enforcement
agencies to thoroughly evaluate and examine each of the debtor’s bankruptcy
plans. These agencies are likely to view this as an “impossible burden” as
mentioned above, especially since they have made state-compliant medical
marijuana businesses a low priority due to limited resources.119 The federal
government has repeatedly acknowledged its lack of resources to investigate
and prosecute drug offenses.120
D. Section 1129(a)(11) Feasibility Requirement Would Not Prevent
Confirmation
The feasibility requirement of § 1129(a)(11) only requires the debtor to
prove that its reorganization plan is feasible by a preponderance of the
evidence.121 Moreover, a court reviewing a bankruptcy plan must consider the
totality of the circumstances.122
Although dispensary reorganizations are not infeasible per se, trustees may
argue that the plans are not feasible because any proceeds generated by the
dispensary are subject to government seizure.123 Courts should consider the
likelihood of a government seizure when assessing a plan’s feasibility rather
than viewing dispensary plans as per se infeasible. For example, if the debtor
dispensary has been under investigation and enforcement agencies have
expressed a plan to raid the dispensary, a court may be less likely to find that
its plan meets the § 1129(a)(11) feasibility requirement. On the other hand, if
the debtor is located in an area where U.S. Attorneys have not targeted state119 See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, supra note 4 (“As a general matter, pursuit of [significant
traffickers of illegal drugs] should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are
in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”).
120 See, e.g., Matthew Volkov, Holder Defends Department’s Medical Marijuana Track Record, MAIN
JUSTICE (June 8, 2012, 12:24 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2012/06/08/holder-defends-departmentsmedical-marijuana-track-record/ (referring to the Justice Department’s “limited resources”); Memorandum
from David W. Ogden, supra note 4 (referring to the Justice Department’s “limited investigative and
prosecutorial resources”).
121 Financial Sec. Assurance, Ltd. v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship (In re T-H New Orleans P’ship), 116
F.3d 790, 801 (5th Cir. 1997).
122 In re Mulberry Phosphates, Inc., 149 B.R. 702, 709 (M.D. Fl. 1993).
123 See Marijuana Dispensary’s Chapter 11, supra note 44.
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compliant dispensaries or has made a special effort to demonstrate its
compliance with medical marijuana laws, such as by offering tours to law
enforcement officers, a court may be more likely to find its plan is feasible.
As it is unclear whether the CSA preempts state medical marijuana laws,
the federal government might seize dispensary proceeds meant to fund a plan.
But this alone does not meet the standard of proof. A mere possibility of
seizure does not indicate a reasonable probability it would occur and so
frustrate the plan that liquidation or further financial reorganization becomes
necessary.124 As with any plan, the facts vary greatly from debtor to debtor.125
The possibility of a government seizure of dispensary proceeds is tied to
courts’ concern over legally uncertain businesses. Courts have recognized that
the “risk of uncertain legal foundation of [a] business” may impede plan
confirmation if that risk is “borne disproportionately by unsecured
creditors.”126 In In re Frascella Enterprises, the party opposing the debtor’s
plan confirmation argued that the debtor’s business plan was “fatally flawed”
because “an enforcement action which would enjoin [the debtor’s business
activities], in their view, [was] inevitable, thus rendering [the] revenue
projections unrealistic.”127 The court recognized that the legality of the
debtor’s business was not as clear as the consumers claimed.128 The conflict
between state and federal marijuana laws would add an additional layer of
uncertainty for a court assessing a dispensary’s plan for the risk of an
enforcement action.
The legal and legislative landscape for the medical marijuana industry has
and will continue to change, but dispensaries may hedge against the risk of
seizure by complying with all state and local laws. In contrast, the court in
Frascella denied plan confirmation because the debtor chose not to hedge
against the legal uncertainty of its payday loan business.129 The debtor could
have purchased licenses in every state in which it did business to minimize the
potential for regulatory impairment of its business, but instead planned to “take
a ‘wait and see approach’ in ‘reaction to state attorney general complaints.’”130
The fact that the state attorney general had already received complaints about
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

See 11 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.02 (“[T]he possibility of failure is not fatal.”).
Id. (“[F]easibility is typically regarded as an intensely factual inquiry.”).
See In re Frascella Enters., Inc., 360 B.R. 435, 456 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007).
Id. at 445.
Id. at 456.
See id.
Id.
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the debtor’s business further distinguishes this debtor’s reorganization plan in
Frascella from those of the state-compliant medical marijuana business.131
Unlike the nefarious payday lenders, medical marijuana dispensaries that
are inspected for compliance with state laws are less likely to be subject to
seizure that would interfere with bankruptcy plan payments. This should weigh
in favor of a finding of feasibility.
A court discussed the feasibility requirement for a plan that relied in part on
the proceeds from the debtor’s sale and cultivation of marijuana in In re
McGinnis.132 This case is distinguishable from Frascella because the debtor
did not comply with state law. The court in McGinnis concluded that the
debtor’s proceeds from its marijuana business were insufficient to fund the
plan since the sale of marijuana was in violation of both the CSA and Oregon’s
Medical Marijuana Act133 The court based their decision to deny the debtors
plan on § 1325 (a)(6), the chapter 13 analog to § 1129(a)(11) that similarly
places a condition of feasibility on plan confirmation.134 However, the chapter
13 feasibility standard is much more stringent than the chapter 11 feasibility
standard.135 “Whereas the financial-feasibility requirement for confirmation of
a [c]hapter 13 plan requires a court to find that ‘the debtor will be able to make
all payments under the plan,’” § 1129(a)(11) requires a court to only “find that
it is more likely than not that the [c]hapter 11 plan is not likely to fail.”136
Even if the court believes that the dispensary’s potential for seizure renders
the plan too unreliable, a creditor is still free to reject the debtor’s plan,137
though the cramdown provisions may override this safeguard.138
III. UNCERTAINTY OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS LEAVES OPEN POSSIBILITY
OF PLAN CONFIRMATION NOTWITHSTANDING § 1129(A)(3)
Even if § 1129(a)(3), one of the good-faith provisions, refers to both state
and federal nonbankruptcy law and considers the substance of a chapter 11

131

See id.
See In re McGinnis, 453 B.R. 770, 773 (Bankr. D. Or. 2011).
133 See id. (“I cannot find that the predicted income stream from the marijuana operations is reasonably
certain to produce sufficient income to fund the Plan.”).
134 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2012).
135 See Pardo, supra note 53, at 147–48 (comparing the chapter 11 and chapter 13 feasibility standards).
136 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2006)).
137 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2012).
138 See id. § 1129(b).
132
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plan, the lack of binding authority on whether state-legal medical marijuana
businesses may reorganize in the bankruptcy system may lead courts to
disagree on whether a dispensary plan is confirmable. The § 1129(a)(3) inquiry
requires that courts consider “the totality of the circumstances” in a “‘factintensive, case-by-case inquiry.’”139 Moreover, the bankruptcy court has
discretion to interpret evidence regarding the alleged lack of good faith or
illegality.140 Courts have recognized that “[t]he bankruptcy judge is in the best
position to assess the good faith of the proposal of a plan.”141
In particular, uncertainty over the legality and future of state medical
marijuana laws may convince some bankruptcy courts that the sale of medical
marijuana does not render the plan unconfirmable.142 In this Part, Section A
demonstrates that, given the preemption issue, some courts may look to state
laws rather than the federal CSA to determine whether a plan involving the
sale of medical marijuana satisfies § 1129(a)(3). Rather, the passive nature of
the CSA invites the possibility that the CSA does not preempt state
legalization.143 One academic contends that states have merely stopped
punishing the medical use of marijuana and that the anti-commandeering rule
prohibits Congress from requiring states to enforce the CSA.144 Should a
bankruptcy court agree with that interpretation, the court may prioritize state
laws and conclude that a dispensary’s plan was “proposed . . . not by any
means forbidden by law.”145
Section B argues that some courts might prioritize state medical marijuana
laws in the § 1129(a)(3) analysis because the state law “constitute[s] the de
facto governing law of the land.”146 Criminal law is usually the state’s domain.
Accordingly, states generally exhibit greater power over controlled substance
management.147 Increasing public acceptance of medical marijuana148 has also
139

In re TCI 2 Holdings, L.L.C., 428 B.R. 117, 142 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (quoting In re PPI Enters., Inc.,
324 F.3d 197, 211).
140 See In re Tex. Extrusion Corp., 844 F.2d 1142, 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Koelbl, 751 F.2d 137, 139
(2d Cir. 1984).
141 Tex. Extrusion Corp., 844 F.2d at 1160.
142 This Comment assumes that the debtor does not engage in any activities that would make it proper for
the court to appoint a trustee to operate the debtor’s business.
143 See, e.g., City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 676 (Ct. App. 2007); Mikos,
supra note 10, at 1453–55.
144 See Mikos, supra note 10, at 1455–56.
145 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012).
146 Mikos, supra note 10, at 1422.
147 Id. at 1463–65; see also John Ingold, Medical Marijuana in Colorado Gets Scant Attention from
Federal Prosecutors, DENVER POST (May 18, 2011, 5:44 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/marijuana/
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shown that the federal government’s efforts to influence private behavior have
been unsuccessful despite its proscription of all marijuana.149
Section C contends that the growing number of state legalizations indicate
an increase in percolation through the federal ban. There are merits to allowing
such state experimentation.150 If medical marijuana businesses and their
customers (medical users) may exist mostly without trouble from the federal
government, then they should also be permitted to file for bankruptcy like any
other business. Otherwise, the states would not receive an accurate depiction of
how their medical marijuana policies work in practice. This is especially
important for states that pushed for legalization on economic grounds.
Section D discusses the Code’s silence on this issue and other arbitrary and
unfair results that may occur should the sale of medical marijuana poison a
debtor’s reorganization plan. A bankruptcy court might consider these
arguments to allow confirmation of a dispensary’s plan.
A. Preemption Analysis May Lead Bankruptcy Judges to Refer to State
Medical Marijuana Laws for the § 1129(a)(3) Requirement
Despite the clear conflict between the CSA and mounting state legalization
of medical marijuana, the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
preemption issue.151 Shortly after the Raich decision, California Attorney
General Bill Lockyer stated that the ruling did not affect California’s
legalization of medical marijuana.152 “Lockyer also underscored the role of
local law enforcement in upholding state, not federal, law,” according to

ci_18084197 (reporting low levels of federal prosecution of marijuana cases in states that have legalized
medical marijuana).
148 See Fred Backus, CBS News Poll: Marijuana and Medical Marijuana, CBS NEWS (Nov. 18, 2011,
6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/poll_marijuana_111811.pdf.
149 Mikos, supra note 10, at 1470.
150 See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op., 532 U.S. 483, 502 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Margaret
H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 751–52 (2011).
151 See City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 674 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Mikos,
supra note 10, at 1442; Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police,
91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1490 (2006) (“[The Raich Court] neither declared California’s law invalid on
preemption or any other grounds nor gave any indication that California officials must assist in enforcement of
the CSA.”); Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After
Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 34.
152 Federal Marijuana Law, AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, http://safeaccessnow.org/article.php?id=2638
(last visited, Oct. 3, 2013).
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Americans for Safe Access.153 The Offices of the Attorney Generals of Alaska,
Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon as well as the
Governor of Vermont and the Washington State Department of Health have
issued similar statements upholding their state medical marijuana laws postRaich.154
Part of the states’ power is rooted in the anti-commandeering rule, which
limits Congress’s preemption power.155 To distinguish between state actions
that are subject to preemption and those that are not, Robert Mikos proposes
the “state-of-nature framework” as the boundary between commandeering and
preemption: “Congress may drive states into—or prevent states from departing
from—this state of nature (preemption), but Congress may not drive them out
of—or prevent them from returning to—the state of nature
(commandeering).”156 Mikos argues, “This new state-of-nature framework is
better suited for the largely ignored paradigm[,] . . . situations in which states
allow behavior Congress has banned[,] than is the commonly employed
action/inaction framework.”157
After California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act in 1996, over a
dozen other states and many local governments followed with their own
legalization efforts. The legalization of medical marijuana is effectively state
inaction against the CSA.158 Federal drug laws are not enforceable in the face
of the states’ inaction because allowing Congress to preempt the states’
inaction would amount to Congress commanding the states to enforce the
federal ban on medical marijuana.159 Mikos explained that “forc[ing] states to
criminalize drugs Congress has banned, adopt mandatory prosecution policies,
raise sanctions, revise sentencing laws, and shift resources toward marijuana
cases . . . tread[s] on whatever values the anti-commandeering rule seeks to
promote.”160
A California state appellate court has stated, “[T]here is no conflict based
on the fact that Congress has chosen to prohibit the possession of medical

153

Id.
Implications of U.S. Supreme Court Medical Marijuana Ruling, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT,
http://www.mpp.org/reports/gonzales-v-raich-the-impact.html (last visited, Oct. 3, 2013).
155 Mikos, supra note 10, at 1446.
156 Id. at 1448.
157 Id. at 1445.
158 See id. at 1424.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1454.
154
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marijuana, while California has chosen not to.”161 In City of Garden Grove v.
Superior Court of Orange County, the court considered whether a police
department was required to return small amounts of marijuana that had been
seized from a medical marijuana patient qualified under the Compassionate
Use Act.162 It held that the federal CSA did not prohibit the return of marijuana
to an individual “whose possession of the drug is legally sanctioned under state
law.”163 The court reasoned that the state’s return of a small quantity of
marijuana did not pose a “real or meaningful threat to the federal drug
enforcement effort.”164 It further explained that California’s Compassionate
Use Act “does not expressly exempt medical marijuana from prosecution”
under the CSA, but merely “limits state prosecution for medical marijuana
possession.”165
B. Courts May Defer to State Medical Marijuana Laws over the Federal CSA
Due to the Greater Impact of States’ Laws
Taking aside the preemption issue, on a practical level, the federal
government lacks the necessary resources to enforce its own ban against
medical marijuana diligently.166 Some have observed that even after Gonzales
v. Raich, “[t]he states continue to wield both de jure and de facto power to
legalize medical marijuana in the CSA’s shadow.”167 Despite the federal
government’s threat of strong penalties for violating the CSA, its impact on
private behavior is restricted.168 This is due in large part to the lack of
“wholehearted cooperation of state law enforcement authorities.”169 States
wield greater influence over private forces that shape our actions, because state
legalization has led to more relaxed personal attitudes towards the use and sale
of medical marijuana.170
In Colorado, federal prosecutors pursued only 19 forfeiture cases related to
marijuana and only four criminal marijuana cases in 2010.171 This suggests a
161 Garden Grove v. Superior Court of Orange Cnty., 157 Cal. App. 4th 355, 385 (2008); see also Cnty. of
Butte v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 4th 729, 735 (3d Dist. 2009).
162 Garden Grove, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 363, 373.
163 Id. at 386.
164 Id. at 384.
165 Id. at 384–85.
166 Mikos, supra note 10, at 1424.
167 Id. at 1444.
168 See id. at 1424.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See Ingold, supra note 147.
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low level of federal enforcement in a state that has more medical marijuana
dispensaries than McDonalds and Starbucks combined.172
In fact, “[a]s a practical matter, virtually all arrests and prosecutions for
marijuana possession occur at the state level.”173 However, state law
enforcement has been more lenient with these marijuana violations than the
federal government, even when the arrest is for recreation rather than medical
use.174 State law enforcement agencies “drop cases that the federal government
would likely prosecute if they had the resources. They expunge drug
convictions that trigger federal supplemental sanctions. And they punish
offenders less severely than would federal sentencing authorities. None of
these decisions by the states have been declared preempted . . . .”175
Opinion polls suggest citizens generally support state medical marijuana
legalization. A May 2012 poll by Mason-Dixon Polling & Research showed
that of 1,000 likely 2012 general election voters, 74% believed that the
president should respect state medical marijuana laws.176 Only 15% of the
respondents believed that the federal government should prosecute under the
federal law regardless of whether the individuals were acting in compliance
with state law.177
Individuals have also been able to assert their lenient view on medical
marijuana in the judicial system.178 In New Hampshire, a man who had been
growing medical marijuana was charged by the state with felony drug
manufacturing.179 He “argued that a conviction would be unjust in light of the
fact that [he] was growing cannabis for his own religious and medical use.”180
The court used its discretion to provide a jury instruction on the nullification
172 60 Minutes: Medical Marijuana: Will Colorado’s “green rush” last?, (CBS television broadcast Oct.
19, 2012), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=50133577n.
173 Judd Legum, After Passage of Legalization Initiative, 220 Marijuana Cases Dismissed in Washington
State, THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 10, 2012, 1:11 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/11/10/1176151/afterpassage-of-legalization-initiative-220-marijuana-cases-dismissed-in-washington-state/.
174 Mikos, supra note 10, at 1453.
175 Id. at 1453–54.
176 See Mason-Dixon Polling & Research, Inc., Marijuana Policy Project National Survey Question,
MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT 1, 1 (2012), http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/download-materials/MPP-M-DPoll-5-12.pdf.
177 See id.
178 See Ian Millhiser, New Hampshire Jury Acquits Marijuana Grower in Apparent Case of Jury
Nullification, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 17, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/09/17/856381/
new-hampshire-jury-acquits-marijuana-grower-in-apparent-case-of-jury-nullification/.
179 Id.
180 Id.
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issue even though the prosecutor had argued against this.181 The judge
instructed the jury that “even if you find that the State has proven each and
every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, you may still
find the defendant not guilty if you have a conscientious feeling that a not
guilty verdict would be a fair result in this case.”182 The jury unanimously
acquitted the defendant.183
The jury’s lenience in New Hampshire suggests that even the most
stringent American communities are warming to legalization. New Hampshire
remains the only New England state to resist state medical marijuana
legislation.184 Polls and successful jury nullifications suggest that increasing
state legalization may affect the public perception of medical marijuana use
even in states that have resisted the shift in policy.
A similar attitude has developed in Colorado. Boulder District Attorney
Stan Garnett told CBS’s 60 Minutes that it is difficult to find a jury that will
convict a marijuana defendant because of the state’s overwhelming support for
legalization.185 Garnett stated, “This community has made it very clear that
criminal enforcement of marijuana is not something they want me to spend any
time on.”186 These situations demonstrate the influence that state constituents’
attitudes toward medical marijuana can have on local law enforcement and
state courts.
Even federal judges may afford state medical marijuana laws more weight
than the federal ban. In United States v. Daubert, the federal government
charged Daubert with conspiracy to maintain a drug-involved premises.187
Daubert was previously a partner in a medical marijuana business in Montana,
a state that has legalized medical marijuana.188 The suit arose after the DEA

181

See id.
Id.
183 Id.
184 See Matt Simon, NH Poised to Be Next to Legalize Medical Marijuana, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 11,
2012), http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/opinion/commentary/983281-465/simon-nh-poised-to-be-nextto.html#.
185 60 Minutes, supra note 172.
186 Id.
187 Information: Conspiracy to Maintain Drug-Involved Premises, at *1, United States v. Daubert, No. CR
12-21-M (D. Mont. Apr. 10, 2012), 2012 WL 7810147.
188 Gwen Florio, Medical Marijuana Activist Daubert Gets Probation in Federal Drug Case, MISSOULIAN
(Sept. 7, 2012, 6:15 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/local/medical-marijuana-activist-daubert-getsprobation-in-federal-drug-case/article_e279b332-f850-11e1-abe0-0019bb2963f4.html.
182
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raided the business in 2011.189 Daubert pled guilty to the charge and potentially
faced a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison.190 The federal
government sought to impose a six-and-a-half to eight-year sentence.191 Judge
Christensen, sitting for the United States District Court of Montana, entered a
sentence for only five years of probation.192 Judge Christensen explained that
in determining Daubert’s sentence she considered his education, intelligence,
faith, poor health, and the fact that “he ha[d] been an advocate for the use of
medical marijuana in conformance with what he believed to be the spirit and
the intent of Montana law.”193 The lawmakers and law enforcement officers
partly operated on the state level by considering Daubert’s efforts to comply
with Montana law.194
C. The Federal Government’s Concession to State Experimentation
Over a third of the states in the U. S. have legalized medical marijuana as
of the November 2012 elections.195 Thus far, the federal government has not
challenged the state legalization and lack of enforcement against medical
marijuana businesses in compliance with state laws, which suggests that
Congress is allowing states to experiment on their own.196
Several members of Congress have been working towards federal
acceptance of state legalization. Colorado Representatives Dianna DeGette, Ed
Perlmutter, and Jared Pollis are drafting legislation that would exempt states
that have legalized marijuana from the federal CSA.197 Texas Representative
Ron Paul and former Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank also sent a

189

Id.
Plea Agreement at *2, United States v. Daubert, No. CR 12-21-M, (D. Mont. Apr. 11, 2012), 2012 WL
7810073.
191 Florio, supra note 188.
192 Transcript of Sentencing at 57, United States v. Daubert, No. CR 12-21-M (D. Mont. Nov. 1, 2012).
193 Id. at 58–59.
194 Nicole Flatow, Meet the Montana Man Convicted of a Federal Crime for Working to Make Medical
Marijuana Safer, THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 4, 2012, 3:45 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/10/04/
906271/meet-the-montana-lobbyist-convincted-of-a-federal-crime-for-working-to-make-medical-marijuanasafer/?mobile=nc.
195 State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 2013), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx.
196 See Young, supra note 151, at 34.
197 Scot Kersgaard, Colorado Reps Seek State Exemption from Federal Pot Prohibition Laws, COLORADO
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 10, 2012, 12:49 PM), http://coloradoindependent.com/126304/colorado-reps-seekexemption-from-federal-pot-prohibition-laws.
190
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letter to President Obama, asking that he urge his administration to stop
prosecuting marijuana activity that is legal under state law.198
A particularly telling federal concession to state medical marijuana laws
occurred in early 2012, when Congress approved a District of Columbia
Council bill that allows D.C. to license up to eight medical marijuana
dispensaries.199 Congress must approve all D.C. bills before they become law
pursuant to the U.S. Constitution.200 In this dual role of national and local
governance, members of Congress are required to uphold federal laws in that
local governance as representatives of the federal government. This may be
considered evidence that the federal government is changing its position and
acquiescing to legalization on some level.201
This recent change is especially revealing in light of the fact that Congress
had previously derailed D.C.’s efforts to legalize medical marijuana.202 D.C.
voters had actually approved a referendum to authorize the sale of medical
marijuana back in 1998.203 The referendum passed by nearly 70% of the vote,
the greatest majority of any medical marijuana initiative passed at the time.204
However, the success of the initiative was thwarted by Congressman Bob Barr
(R-GA), who authorized a last minute amendment that withdrew funds
necessary to implement the passed referendum.205 The Barr Amendment
effectively blocked any new medical marijuana legalization efforts for over a
decade until Congress lifted it in December 2009.206 Without the Barr
Amendment, the D.C. Council was free to seek congressional approval of
plans to implement its legalization initiative.207

198

Flatow, supra note 194.
See Deborah Morgan, Congress Conflicts with Federal Law by Approving D.C. Medical Marijuana,
EXAMINER (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/congress-conflicts-with-federal-law-byapproving-dc-medical-marijuana.
200 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
201 See Morgan, supra note 199.
202 Sam Jewler, Medical Marijuana Finally Heads for D.C., TIME (January 27, 2010), http://www.time.
com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1956673,00.html.
203 Id.
204 Id. Eight other state initiatives to legalize medical marijuana had passed by 1998. Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. Ironically, Barr left the Republican Party in 2006 and joined the Medical Marijuana Project to
lobby against the Barr Amendment. Marijuana Project Parties with Barr, WASHINGTON TIMES (May 23,
2008), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/may/23/marijuana-project-parties-with-barr/?page=all#
pagebreak.
207 See Jewler, supra note 202.
199
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The November 2012 elections and referendums also shed light on the
federal government treatment of state legalization, as Washington and
Colorado became the first states to legalize recreational marijuana.208 This
significant change in state law highlighted the clear disagreement on marijuana
between state and federal law, which has existed since California first legalized
the controlled substance for medical use in 1996.209 The federal government’s
close evaluation of these laws is likely to crossover into state medical
marijuana laws. However, federal reaction has remained widely uncertain.210
The U.S. Attorney’s Office initially declined to comment on whether it
would sue to block the states from executing the ballot measures211—
something it did not do when state medical marijuana laws passed. Jeff
Dorschner, a spokesman for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the District of
Colorado issued the following statement the day after the election: “The
Department of Justice’s enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act remains
unchanged. In enacting the Controlled Substances Act, Congress determined
that marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance. We are reviewing the
ballot initiative and have no additional comment at this time.”212
208 Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 2012, at P15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/marijuana-laws-eased-incolorado-and-washington.html?_r=0.
209 Kristen Wyatt, Pot Votes in 2 States Challenge U.S. Drug War, CBS MONEY WATCH (Nov. 8, 2012,
8:15am), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505245_162-57546861/pot-votes-in-2-states-challenge-us-drug-war/.
John Davis, a medical marijuana provider in Washington, noted that “[Washington’s new] law does not
prevent conflicts,” but instead “will highlight the necessity to find some kind of resolution between state and
federal laws.” Id.
210 See Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office, Statement by U.S. Attorney’s Office Regarding
Passage of Amendment 64, (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao/co/press_releases/2012/
November2012/11_7_12.html (indicating no comment from the Department of Justice).
211 Healy, supra note 208.
212 Statement by U.S. Attorney’s Office, supra note 210. In August 2013, the Department of Justice
announced an update to its marijuana enforcement policy, taking into account of the Colorado and Washington
ballot initiatives that legalized medical marijuana under state law. Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice
Department
Announces
Update to Marijuana
Enforcement Policy (Aug.
29, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/August/13-opa-974.html. The Deputy Attorney General provided
guidance regarding marijuana enforcement in a memorandum to all United States Attorneys. Memorandum
from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to All U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. The memorandum listed the federal
government’s eight enforcement priorities, which included preventing distribution to minors, preventing
diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law to other states, and preventing stateauthorized marijuana activity from being used as a pretext for other illegal activity. Id. The memorandum did
not indicate that the U.S. Attorney’s Office would sue to block Colorado and Washington’s ballot initiatives,
but rather stated that prosecutors should “review cases on a case-by-case basis and weigh all available
information and evidence, including, but not limited to, whether the operation is demonstrably in compliance
with a strong and effective state regulatory system” when exercising prosecutorial discretion. Id.
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U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder’s silence on the issue on the eve of the
election also contributes to the uncertainty over the future of state marijuana
laws. This uncertainty may place greater weight on the bankruptcy court’s
interpretation of § 1129(a)(3) when a dispensary’s bankruptcy reaches the
confirmation stage. Marijuana supporters believe that Holder’s silence
indicates that the federal government is unlikely to intervene with state
marijuana laws.213 Advocates point to 2010, when Holder strongly opposed a
California ballot measure that would have similarly legalized recreational
marijuana.214 Nine former DEA officials sent a letter urging Holder to
denounce the California ballot measure.215 In response, Holder vowed that the
federal government would “vigorously enforce the [CSA] against those
individuals and organizations that possess, manufacture or distribute marijuana
for recreational use, even if such activities are permitted under state law.”216
However, Holder’s statement specifically addressed recreational use and
not medical use.217 When DEA officials asked Holder to publicly reiterate the
Administration’s opposition to medical marijuana during the 2012 election,
Holder declined to comment.218 In response, the former DEA officials took
Holder’s silence to “convey[] to the American public and the global
community a tacit acceptance of these dangerous initiatives.”219
The same “tacit acceptance” can be said to apply to state medical marijuana
laws. And it is this “tacit acceptance” by the federal government that has led
states to experiment further in progressively weakening the federal ban.
The resulting state experimentation allows medical marijuana policies to be
tailored to “local conditions and local tastes, while a national government must
take a uniform—and hence less desirable—approach.”220 The state laws
213 See Bill Briggs, Weed Wars: If States Legalize Marijuana, Will Feds Still Crack Down or Steer
Clear?, NBCNEWS.COM (Nov. 5, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/04/14886823-weed-warsif-states-legalize-marijuana-will-feds-still-crack-down-or-steer-clear?lite.
214 See id.
215 Alex Dobuzinskis, Eric Holder Urged to Oppose Marijuana Ballot By Ex-DEA Heads, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 7, 2012, 9:02 pm), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/07/eric-holder-marijuana_n_1866384.
html.
216 Steve Gorman, Attorney General Holder Opposes California Marijuana Bill, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2010,
12:45 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/16/us-usa-marijuana-california-idUSTRE69F03V201010
16.
217 Id.
218 See Dobuzinskis, supra note 215.
219 Id.
220 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493
(1987).
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deviate not only from the federal law, but also vary greatly from one
another.221 For example, while all states require that prospective medical
marijuana users prove they are suffering from a qualifying condition, the types
of conditions may be highly restricted, as in New Mexico,222 or may
encompass all “illnesses for which marijuana provides relief,” as in
California.223 The amount patients are allowed to possess and the mechanisms
for dispensing medical marijuana also depend on the state or local
government.224 Such variety among and within the many states presents an
opportunity to test different theories in political “laboratories.”225
In Oakland Cannabis, Justice Stevens articulated a similar benefit in his
concurrence, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsberg:
That respect [for the sovereign States] imposes a duty on federal
courts, whenever possible, to avoid or minimize conflict between
federal and state law, particularly in situations in which the citizens
of a [s]tate have chosen to “serve as a laboratory” in the trial of
“novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.” . . . By passing Proposition 215, California voters have
decided that seriously ill patients and their primary caregivers should
be exempt from prosecution under state laws for cultivating and
possessing marijuana if the patient’s physician recommends using the
226
drug for treatment.

In the Raich case, Justice O’Connor wrote a dissenting opinion criticizing
the Court’s inflexible interpretation of the federal ban and acknowledged the
merits of the state legalization “experiment.”227 O’Connor stated,
“California . . . has come to its own conclusion about the difficult and sensitive
question of whether marijuana should be available to relieve severe pain and
suffering. Today the Court sanctions an application of the [CSA] that
extinguishes that experiment . . . .”228
221

Y. Lu, Medical Marijuana Policy in the United States, HUNTINGTON’S OUTREACH PROJECT FOR EDUC.
STANFORD (May 15, 2012), http://www.stanford.edu/group/hopes/cgi-bin/wordpress/2012/05/medicalmarijuana-policy-in-the-united-states/.
222 See The Twenty States, supra note 12.
223 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2009).
224 See Lu, supra note 221.
225 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
226 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op., 532 U.S. 483, 502 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(quoting Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
227 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 43 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
228 Id.
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In Raich, the Court reasoned that even marijuana grown for home
consumption would make its way into interstate commerce, therefore
permitting federal regulation.229 Permitting states freedom to experiment with
marijuana legalization “without risk to the rest of the country” is not
necessarily inconsistent with Raich, because the “laboratory” theory
underlying tacit federal approval of state experimentation “assumes that
successful state experiments will often be adopted at the national level.”230
Demonstrably, the debate surrounding the legalization of marijuana has
been compared to the national debate during the Prohibition Era. Similar to
marijuana legalization, the repeal of prohibition progressed largely on the state
level.231 Before the federal government repealed national prohibition in 1933,
eleven states repealed their state prohibition laws.232Anti-prohibition voters
overwhelmingly decided233 that, “if the federal government believes so
strongly in prohibition, then let them—and them alone—be responsible for
enforcing it.”234 The first state repeal occurred in 1923 when New York
Governor Al Smith signed legislation repealing the state’s prohibition law.235
In a memorandum, Governor Smith noted that the legislation did not exempt
New York from federal prohibition, but simply left alcohol prosecutions for
the federal government.236 He reasoned, “The burden imposed on the [s]tate to
prosecute traffickers in liquor as violators of the [s]tate statute is a wasteful and
futile one because of the refusal of grand juries to indict and of petit juries to
convict.”237
Similar reasoning can be applied to state legalization of medical marijuana.
The Department of Justice has repeatedly indicated that its limited resources
are best spent on those who “go[] beyond that which the states have

229

See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 751–52 (2011)
(“[N]ot all interstate effects are incompatible with the concept of states as laboratories.”).
230 Id.
231 See, e.g., Briggs, supra note 213.
232 DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 168 (2d ed. 2000).
233 See id. (“In every [state election], wets won by a considerable margin, including two-to-one in
Michigan and California, and over four-to-one in New Jersey.”).
234 Paul Armentano & Richard Evans, Californians Repealed Alcohol Prohibition, They Should Vote To
Repeal Marijuana Prohibition Too, LEWROCKWELL.COM (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.lewrockwell.com/
armentano-p/armentano-p48.1.html.
235 HENRY MOSKOWITZ, ALFRED E. SMITH: AN AMERICAN CAREER 251 (1924), available at
http://www.archive.org/stream/alfredesmithanam009261mbp/alfredesmithanam009261mbp_djvu.txt.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 253.
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authorized,” and not “people who are acting in conformity with state law.”238
Furthermore, as previously discussed, there has been at least one instance in
which a jury unanimously acquitted a marijuana grower charged with
marijuana cultivation through jury nullification.239
D. Statutory Interpretation and Unfair and Arbitrary Results
The Code does not explicitly prohibit medical marijuana businesses from
participating in bankruptcy even though provisions in the U.S. Tax Code and
the Code suggest that Congress had the ability to specifically exclude such
businesses.240
The language of § 362(b)(23) suggests that Congress deliberately chose not
to impose limitations on the ability of medical marijuana businesses to file for
bankruptcy or utilize the protections provided under the bankruptcy
umbrella.241 Congress amended § 362(b) to except from the automatic stay
actions to evict the debtor from a residential leasehold when the action is based
on “illegal use of controlled substances on [that] property.”242 Although
Congress has clearly contemplated how illegal drug use may impact a debtor’s
bankruptcy,243 similar consequences for businesses in either chapter 7 or
chapter 11 are not present in the Code. That Congress deliberately declined to
impose any limitations on a marijuana dispensary’s ability to file for
bankruptcy suggests that dispensaries should be able to file for bankruptcy like
any other business.244
By contrast, Congress specifically carved out an exception to the deduction
of business expenses as it applies to businesses in violation of the CSA in the
Tax Code.245 Section 280E of the Tax Code prohibits the deduction of
expenses related to trafficking controlled substances.246 The inclusion of this

238 Volkov, supra note 120 (quoting U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder at a House Judiciary Committee
meeting); see also Memorandum from David W. Ogden, supra note 4.
239 Supra notes 178–183 and accompanying text.
240 See 26 U.S.C. § 280E (2012) (addressing deduction of drug trafficking expenses); 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b)(23) (2012) (limiting bankruptcy protection for individual debtors who used controlled substances in a
residential leasehold).
241 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(23).
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012).
245 26 U.S.C. § 280E.
246 Id.
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provision suggests that Congress was aware that certain states have legalized
medical marijuana to the extent that dispensary businesses existed.
The restriction Congress placed on marijuana dispensaries’ ability to
deduct business expenses was not a categorical condemnation of the business.
In Californians Helping to Alleviate Medical Problems, Inc. v. Commissioner,
the U.S. Tax Court held that § 280E applied only to expenditures “in
connection with the illegal sale of drugs.”247 Thus, while the dispensary in
CHAMP was prohibited from deducting its business expenses incurred in
dispensing medical marijuana, it was able to deduct expenses from the
operation of its caregiving business.248 Since the caregiving expenses were
sufficiently separate from the dispensary’s marijuana distribution expenses, the
§ 280E prohibition on deduction did not apply.249 The court noted that § 280E
and its legislative history “do not express an intent to deny the deduction of all
of a taxpayer’s business expenses simply because the taxpayer was involved in
trafficking in a controlled substance.”250
A bankruptcy court considering the chapter 13 filing of an individual
engaged in medical marijuana business applied a similar analysis. In McGinnis
the court held that the debtor could remain in bankruptcy if he could support
his plan with income produced from activities other than the sale and
cultivation of marijuana.251 The debtor’s chapter 13 plan indicated that it
would be funded by three sources: a business that rented space to medical
marijuana growers, sales from his own medical marijuana operation, and rental
income from a commercial property.252 The court held that it could not confirm
the debtor’s plan because it relied in part on the proceeds from the debtor’s
sale and cultivation of marijuana.253
However, the court gave the debtor a chance to submit an amended plan for
confirmation.254 This suggests that the court had no issue with the debtor’s sale
and cultivation of marijuana, but rather with the debtor funding its bankruptcy
247 Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc. v. Comm’r, 128 T.C. 173, 177 (2007)
(emphasis added) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 280E (2006)). The court also held that § 280E applies to such activities
regardless of their compliance with state laws. Id.
248 Id. at 185.
249 Id. at 182.
250 Id.
251 In re McGinnis, 453 B.R. 770, 773 (Bankr. D. Or. 2011); see also supra notes 132–133 and
accompanying text.
252 McGinnis, 453 B.R. at 771.
253 Id. at 773.
254 Id.
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with proceeds generated from marijuana sales. If the debtor were able to fund
its bankruptcy with income from sources unrelated to marijuana, it would seem
an absurd result that the debtor could still receive income from marijuana
distribution but not use this income to pay its creditors.
Debtor’s disposable income in chapter 13 is defined as “current monthly
income” which includes income “from all sources.”255 If bankruptcy courts
adopt the interpretation of Tax Code § 280E stated in CHAMP and restrict plan
funding to only non-marijuana income, distressed creditors would lose out on a
source of income to satisfy the debtor’s outstanding obligations. Moreover,
legislative history suggests Congress intended the term “individual with
regular income” to include individuals who receive income from less
traditional sources.256 The Senate Report illustrates the Congress intended a
broad interpretation of “income”:
The effect of this definition, and of its use in [§] 109(e), is to expand
substantially the kinds of individuals that are eligible for relief under
chapter 13 . . . . The definition encompasses all individuals with
incomes that are sufficiently stable and regular to enable them to
make payments under a chapter 13 plan. Thus, individuals on
welfare, social security, fixed pension incomes, or who live on
257
investment incomes, will be able to work out repayment plans . . . .

In light of the exception for businesses in violation of the CSA in the Tax
Code, Congress’s silence on the consequences of the use or sale of controlled
substances on the ability to reorganize under chapter 11 suggests that banning
dispensaries from the protection of chapter 11 would be an unfair and arbitrary
result.

255

11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2012).
See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 24 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5810; H.R. REP. NO. 95595, at 311–12 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6268–69 (explaining the effect of the definition
for “individual with regular income” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(30)).
257 Supra note 256.
256
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IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ALLOWING BANKRUPTCIES OF
MARIJUANA DISPENSARIES
A. Bankruptcy Policy Supports Allowing Medical Marijuana Dispensaries to
File for Bankruptcy
Prohibiting marijuana dispensaries from reorganizing under chapter 11
would contradict the policy goals of bankruptcy. Marijuana dispensaries face
the same financial difficulties that compel traditional businesses into
bankruptcy.258 Similarly, a dispensary’s creditors are subject to the same
universal problem suffered by all creditors in bankruptcy: too many creditors
and not enough assets.
If a court refuses to consider a dispensary’s income as a source of
repayment, creditors will be the ones harmed. They might only receive the
business’s liquidation value rather than its going-concern value. When a debtor
dispensary does not have enough assets to pay most of its unsecured creditors,
courts should allow the dispensary to pursue bankruptcy to satisfy more of its
creditors and minimize the common pool problem. Bankruptcy has been
described as “a debt collection device targeted to the common pool
problem.”259 Denying bankruptcy protection to medical marijuana dispensaries
also denies their creditors the ability to maximize the amount they can recover
in bankruptcy.
Furthermore, bankruptcy is not an appropriate forum to challenge the
constitutionality of state laws. The preemption issue is sure to arise should
more courts deny medical marijuana dispensaries plan confirmation. As
explained in the Introduction, courts have referred to both federal and state
laws when evaluating the § 1129(a)(3) condition to confirmation.260
One group of medical marijuana business attorneys noted that the inability
to reorganize around the sale of medical marijuana would imply “serious issues
for the legitimacy of the medical cannabis industry as bankruptcy is a
fundamental escape hatch for most entities and their creditors.261 Should
bankruptcy courts develop a policy of denial of bankruptcy relief to medical

258
259
260
261

See supra Introduction.
Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 25, at 950.
See supra Introduction.
Bricken, supra note 58.

CHENG GALLEYSPROOFS2

140

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

3/5/2014 9:07 AM

[Vol. 30

cannabis entities, the legitimacy of the industry itself will continue to be
stymied.”262
B. Patients’ Loss of Access to Safe Medical Marijuana
If bankruptcy protection is not available to medical marijuana dispensaries
operating legally under state law, insolvent dispensaries may turn to black
market sources to sell their remaining assets when their debts preclude them
from their normal, regulated operations. Similarly, if state licensed
dispensaries continue to disappear, unregulated distributors may take over their
demand. This moves medical marijuana patients out of the regulated regime
and poses a significant risk to their health.263
Consider Mother Earth’s as an example. At a press conference held during
its bankruptcy, the attorney representing Mother Earth’s explained that closing
the facility would force its patients to resort to the black market.264 “They have
exhausted all other means of access,” he said.265 Before the bankruptcy judge
granted the debtor’s landlord relief from the automatic stay, forcing Mother
Earth’s to shut down, Mother Earth’s was the only licensed medical marijuana
dispensary in the area.266 It served patients in Riverside, San Diego, Imperial,
and Orange County.267 According to its bankruptcy filings, Mother Earth’s
“receive[d] referrals from physicians and well-established institutions
throughout the county. These medical institutions include[d] Kaiser
Permanente, Sharp HealthCare, Scripps, and USCD Oncology Department.”268
Unlike black market sources in the area, Mother Earth’s held a license from
the San Diego Sheriff’s Department.269 In a letter in support of Mother Earth’s,
U.S. Representative Bob Filner noted that the dispensary “operate[d] under a

262

Id.
See AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, MEDICAL CANNABIS DISPENSING COLLECTIVES AND LOCAL
REGULATION 1, 9 (2011), available at http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/sourcefiles/dispensaries.pdf.
264 Nadin Abbott, Mother Earth Dispensary Files Emergency Stay; Patients Tell Their Stories, EAST
COUNTY MAGAZINE (July 25, 2012), http://www.eastcountymagazine.org/node/10522. According to the owner
of Mother Earth’s, Bob Reidel, “more than 70,000 legitimate medical marijuana patients” will suffer from the
closure while “the black market will flourish.” Dorian Hargrove, San Diego County’s Last Legal Marijuana
Dispensary Forced Out of Business, SAN DIEGO READER (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.sandiegoreader.com/
weblogs/news-ticker/2012/aug/31/san-diego-countys-last-legal-marijuana-dispensary-/.
265 Abbott, supra note 264.
266 Letter from Bob Filner, supra note 74.
267 Abbott, supra note 264; see also Letter from Bob Filner, supra note 74.
268 Abbott, supra note 264.
269 Id.
263
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strict county ordinance that mandates that the facility is inspected monthly by
the San Diego Sheriff’s Department and according to these inspection reports,
all parties have followed the letter of law.”270 Congressman Filner also urged
the U.S. Attorney to consider the thirteen employees who would lose their jobs
if the dispensary shut down.271
California passed the Medical Marijuana Program Act (“MMP”) of 2003 to
combat the perils of marijuana distribution on the black market and to clarify
an existing basis to “implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable
distribution of marijuana to all patients in medial need of marijuana.”272 The
MMP allows qualified patients and their caregivers to “collectively or
cooperatively” cultivate medical marijuana.273 It exempts collectives and
cooperatives, such as Mother Earth’s, from criminal sanctions associated with
the sale of marijuana.274 Dispensaries also provide access to patients who do
not have the means to cultivate their own medical marijuana.275
Dispensaries have produced other positive externalities for society as
well.276 Dispensaries offer a safer environment for patients who might
otherwise resort to the black market to acquire the materials they need for
medical treatment.277 They provide patients with counseling, psychosocial
support, and social services such as food and housing.278 This type of service
integration is particularly beneficial for those diagnosed with chronic or
terminal illnesses.279 Experts who have studied medical marijuana patients
have noted that the patient based care model employed by most dispensaries
may help “address issues besides the illness itself that might contribute to longterm physical and emotional health outcomes, such as the prevalence of
depression among the chronically ill.”280

270

Letter from Bob Filner, supra note 74.
Id.
272 AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, supra note 263, at 4.
273 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.775 (West 2009); AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, supra note
263, at 22.
274 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.775 (West 2009).
275 AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, supra note 263, at 3, 4.
276 See id. at 6–8.
277 Id. at 1.
278 Amanda E. Reiman, Self-Efficacy, Social Support and Service Integration at Medical Cannabis
Facilities in the San Francisco Bay Area of California, 16 HEALTH & SOCIAL CARE 31, 32–33 (2008).
279 Id. at 33.
280 AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, supra note 263, at 11–12.
271
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There is also evidence that the high security measures employed by
dispensaries reduce crime in the surrounding community.281 The California
Center for Population Research evaluated survey data from all dispensaries
operating in Sacramento, California and concluded that “some security
measures, such as security cameras, having a door man outside, and having
signs requiring an ID prescription card, taken by medical marijuana dispensary
owners might be effective at reducing crime within the immediate vicinity of
the dispensaries.”282 Patients and dispensary operators report criminal
activity—such as the resale of medical marijuana or the sale to improper
persons.283 While discussing an ordinance that provides regulatory oversight to
dispensaries, Oakland city administrator Barbara Killey stated, “The areas
around the dispensaries may be some of the safest areas of Oakland now
because of the level of security [and] surveillance . . . .”284 Residents in cities
with dispensary regulations have noted in city hearings that the dispensaries
actually help revitalize neighborhoods and bring new customers to adjacent
businesses.285 Thus, there are a myriad of benefits to allowing dispensaries “in
possession” to remain in chapter 11 while they work out a plan to repay
creditors.
Although there are technically two exceptions to the federal ban, they are
highly unlikely to offset the loss of access patients may experience should
dispensaries continue to close their doors after being denied the protections of
bankruptcy.286 First is the Compassionate Investigational New Drug program,
created in 1976 to allow patients to use marijuana legally for therapeutic
purposes.287 Qualifying patients suffered from debilitating illnesses including
glaucoma, AIDS or HIV, multiple sclerosis, and exotosis, a rare bone

281

Id. at 6.
Nancy J. Williams et al., Evaluating Medical Marijuana Dispensary Policies 20 (Oct. 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Cal. Center for Population Res. On-Line Working Paper Series),
available at http://papers.ccpr.ucla.edu/papers/PWP-CCPR-2011-011/PWP-CCPR-2011-011.pdf; see also
Nancy J. Keeple & Bridget Freisthler, Exploring the Ecological Association Between Crime and Medical
Marijuana Dispensaries, 73 STUD. ALCOHOL & DRUGS 523, 523–30 (2012) (suggesting “that the density of
medical marijuana dispensaries may not be associated with crime rates or that other factors, such as measures
dispensaries take to reduce crime (i.e., doormen, video cameras), may increase guardianship such that it deters
possible motivated offenders”).
283 AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, supra note 263, at 12.
284 Id. at 8.
285 Id.
286 Mikos, supra note 10, at 1433–34.
287 Despite Marijuana Furor, 8 Users Get Drug from the Government, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at L33.
282
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disorder.288 It stopped accepting new applications in 1992, but the remaining
Compassionate IND patients were grandfathered in.289 Today, only four
patients currently receive medical marijuana through the program.290
The second exception is triggered by participating in a FDA-approved
research study involving marijuana use.291 However, since the federal
government rarely approves such studies, they would only accommodate a
miniscule portion of the patients who currently qualify for state exemptions.292
C. Potential Safeguards
The federal government’s vacillating approach to licensed state
dispensaries only exacerbates existing ambiguity in the law. Although the DOJ
announced in 2009 that it would not focus on prosecuting marijuana
dispensaries that are in clear compliance with state laws,293 it began to
contradict this approach around 2011.294 The exception of criminal
proceedings from the automatic stay may serve as a safeguard to a complete
shift in policy against state-compliant dispensaries. If federal prosecutors later
decide to target these dispensaries, § 362(b)(1) ensures that “the
commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the
debtor” remains available.295 The U.S. Trustee is also likely to request the
appointment of a trustee when a chapter 11 bankruptcy involves a medical
marijuana business.296 This would provide the federal government notice of the

288 Who Are the Patients Receiving Medical Marijuana Through the Federal Government’s
Compassionate IND Program?, PROCON.ORG (July 19, 2012), http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/
view.answers.php?questionID=000257.
289 See Despite Marijuana Furor, supra note 287, at L33; Clinton A. Werner, Medical Marijuana and the
AIDS Crisis, J. CANNABIS THERAPEUTICS 17, 25 (2001), available at http://www.cannabis-med.org/
membersonly/mo.php?aid=2001-03-04&fid=2001-03-04-2&mode=p&sid=.
290 Who Are the Patients, supra note 288. Two patients in the program have been held anonymous by
request. Although their status in the program cannot be confirmed, these two patients are thought to have
passed away.
291 Mikos, supra note 10, at 1433.
292 Id. at 1433–34.
293 Memorandum from David W. Ogden, supra note 4.
294 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S. Att’ys (June 29, 2011), available at
http://americansforsafeaccess.org/downloads/James_Cole_memo_06_29_2011.pdf; see also Rob Kampia,
Medical Marijuana Meets Hostility from Obama Administration, WASH. POST, May 4, 2012, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/medical-marijuana-meets-hostility-from-obama-administration/
2012/05/04/gIQA80GK2T_story.html.
295 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(1) (2012).
296 In chapter 11, “a party in interest or the United States [T]rustee” may request the appointment of a
trustee “[a]t any time after the commencement of the case but before confirmation of a plan.” Id. § 1104(a).
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dispensary’s business and allow it to determine whether criminal proceedings
are worth pursuing.
The CSA also provides a process for rescheduling controlled substances.297
“[A]ny interested party” may petition the Attorney General to evaluate a
particular drug based on scientific evidence.298
Moreover, allowing only state-compliant dispensaries and growers to file
for bankruptcy would reinforce the legitimate marijuana dispensation industry
and avoid consumers’ retreat to the black market. In Raich, the federal
government argued that allowing any legal category of marijuana would lead
to problems with prosecuting users who illegally obtain marijuana for nonmedicinal use.299 However, state legalization has not occurred without
accompanying regulatory systems.300 For example, most states legalizing
medical marijuana use require that prospective users suffer from a qualifying
condition.301 Qualifying patients must also consider other treatment options
with a physician and ultimately obtain a physician’s recommendation for
medical marijuana.302 Anyone caught violating the prohibition against the
resale of medical marijuana is typically banned from visiting its dispensary.303
Prosecutors may check dispensaries for required licenses,304 closely monitor
activities within the dispensaries,305 check for patient ID cards,306 and engage
in any other preventative monitoring requested by statute.

297

21 U.S.C. § 811(b)–(c) (2012); United States v. Fogarty, 692 F.2d 542, 548 (8th Cir. 1982).
21 U.S.C. § 811(b)–(c); see also Fogarty, 692 F.2d at 548.
299 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2005).
300 See The Twenty States, supra note 12.
301 Id. Typical conditions include “cancer, glaucoma, AIDS (or HIV), and other chronic diseases that
produce symptoms like severe pain, nausea, seizures, or persistent muscle spasms.” Mikos, supra note 10, at
1428.
302 Mikos, supra note 10, at 1428.
303 AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, supra note 263, at 20.
304 Id.
305 Id. Many dispensaries have security cameras installed both inside and outside the premises. See 60
Minutes, supra note 172. In Colorado, the surveillance video is used to ensure that dispensaries adhere to state
laws. See id. Dispensaries have also allowed state and local law enforcement officials as well as state
legislators to regularly tour their facilities. See, e.g., Rebecca Richman Cohen, The Fight Over Medical
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/opinion/the-fight-over-medicalmarijuana.html?_r=0 (showing state officials on a tour of a Montana dispensary); Nicole Flatow, supra note
194 (quoting a former dispensary worker in Montana).
306 Most states require users or caregivers and suppliers to register with the state to qualify for protection
from criminal sanctions. Mikos, supra note 10, at 1428.
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Just as these extensive state regulations allow law enforcement officers to
distinguish between permissible and prohibited activities,307 they would allow
bankruptcy courts to determine which marijuana businesses are recognized by
the state as legitimate businesses and thus worthy of a chance to reorganize.
CONCLUSION
Nothing in the Code explicitly prohibits medical marijuana businesses from
seeking chapter 11. Furthermore, no court has held that a dispensary is unable
to achieve a confirmable chapter 11 plan solely because of the nature of its
business. Bankruptcy courts that have considered U.S. Trustees’ arguments on
this issue have not given much weight to the idea that a dispensary’s business
constitutes cause to dismiss or would prevent plan confirmation.
Since medical marijuana businesses may file for chapter 11 for the same
legitimate reasons as a more traditional business, there should be no cause or
lack of good faith to dismiss the case under § 1112(b). Reorganization plans
based on the sale and cultivation of medical marijuana should also be
confirmable since § 1129(a)(3) does not bar confirmation of plans based on the
legality of the plan’s terms, but rather on the legality of the manner of the
plan’s proposal. Section 1129(a)(11) may not be an obstacle to dispensaries
that are unlikely to be pursued by law enforcement officials.
Furthermore, the federal government has allowed the states to pervade its
prohibition of marijuana through its tacit acceptance of state medical marijuana
laws and limited enforcement. Thus, it is effectively allowing the states to
experiment with medical marijuana dispensaries. If states are allowed to test
the merits of their particular form of legalization, then dispensaries should be
afforded the opportunity to file for bankruptcy like any other business. This
solution is sensible, as the nation increasingly supports the state legalization
efforts and state governments gain financial and other benefits from medical
marijuana businesses despite a depressed economy.
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